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The western world has seen many hegemons1. For almost a century the Aegean was ruled 
by Athens, and what would one day encompass all of Europe became colonized in the fashion of 
that great city. Nevertheless Athens refused to surrender her hegemonic prestige2 and even 
attempted to increase it. Her empire, Sparta, Sicily and all of the colonies of ancient Greece had 
no option but to destroy their oppressor. By the end of the Peloponnesian Wars there was nothing 
left of her Long Walls3, her navy, or her empire. From the wars for hegemony which followed, 
Macedon arose, and under Alexander built the largest political unit ever seen, subduing all of 
central Europe, Northern Africa and the great Persian Empire, only to be torn apart into three 
kingdoms, which were slowly annexed by the Roman Empire. This symbol of republican 
government, dictatorship, imperialism, and western civilization would also slowly decline 
because of an unquenchable thirst for prestige, but this would take more than five hundred years 
after its creation in the west, a thousand after that in the east, and less than one hundred years ago 
in central Europe. Rome fell in 476 A.D. Byzantine followed in 1453. But Vienna pushed on 
until 1918.  
I. Introduction  
Originally a Roman fortified camp built on the land of a vanquished people, Vienna 
started her life off as camp Vindomina, and later as a municipium named Vindobona4. In 803 
A.D. under Charlemagne she acquired the mission which would define her for the next one 
thousand years; the task of defending Western Europe from the East. In this case it was the 
                                                 
1 In this thesis the word hegemon does not necessarily refer to a super-power with global dominance such as Britain 
during Pax Britannica, or the United States today, but rather to a city, country, or empire which maintains political 
dominance over a particular geographical territory, outside of its sovereign boundaries.  
2 By hegemonic prestige, I am referring to the political influence a hegemon has over a particular geographic area.  
3 Athens Long Walls connected the walled in city to her walled in sea port Piraeus. Part of Pericles grand strategy, 
these walls helped her survive as long as she did outnumbered and hated for the cruelty with which she administered 
her empire.  
4 Crankshaw, p.6  
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Avars, and her name properly changed to the Avarian Mark5. After Charlemagne’s death6, 
Western Europe was once again invaded, until 961 A.D. when the Saxon King, Otto the Great, 
while dawning Charlemagne’s crown defeated the Magyars at Lechfeld. Precisely under Otto 
and his Babenberg descendents, Austria or as she was known then the Ottonian Mark, would 
acquire the second mission of her millennium, the role of administrative center of the Holy 
Roman Empire7.  
After a short tenure under the Slavic rule of Crown Prince and later King Ottokar II of 
Bohemia, which followed the fall of the House of Babenberg in 1246, Austria8 became ruled by 
a Swabian Swiss Count and German King, Rudolph IV of Habsburg; her first tenure under the 
family which, pending a brief interlude between 1291 and 1438 when other families were 
elected, would rule her until 1918. In 1453 as a result of the Privilegium Maius, Austria was 
established as a separate entity outside of the German Reich and acquired her status as a 
sovereign nation. As early as 1440, her King Frederick III began carving the initials AIEOU9 all 
over his castles, cathedrals and public buildings. Not much later as a form of consolidation, the 
Habsburgs, at this point Kings of both Austria and Germany, proclaimed their possessions the 
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation10.  
                                                 
5 At this point the Mark consisted mainly of German Franks and other tribes, Brook-Shepherd, p.3  
6 After the fall of Charlemagne, the Avarian Mark was overrun by Slavs and Magyars, Crankshaw, p.62  
7 After defeating the Magyars and conquering Lombardy the Pope John XII crowned Otto Emperor of Rome. In 976 
his son Otto II handed the Ottonian Mark or Ostmark (East Mark) over to the Babenbergs. It is also at this time that 
royal family moved their residence to Vienna. Consequently the Ottonian Mark, at that point a Margrave, rose to the 
rank of Duchy, Brook-Shepherd, pp. 4-10, and was appropriately rechristened Oesterreich, Crankshaw,  p.62      
8 By this point the Ottonian Mark had acquired Styria, Brook-Shepherd, pp.4-10 
9 His diary later revealed that this acronym stood for Austriae Est Imperare Orbi Universo ‘Austria will survive all 
others on earth’ Crankshaw, p.82  
10 Brook-Shepherd, pp. 4-10. There are several opinions as what this exactly entitled the Habsburgs to. As Brook-
Shepherd explains it, at this point this remnant of the Roman Empire, which embodied the Union in Peace of 
Western Christendom, was still united very strongly through the Catholic faith. As ruler of this Empire, the Emperor 
possessed the sole abilities to create kingdoms and elevate princes to kings. Even the later King of Prussia Frederick 
I required the Emperor’s permission to dawn the crown, since the Divine Right of Emperors was needed to bestow 
the Divine Right on Kings. On the other hand, Crankshaw contends that by this point the Imperial crown was void 
completely of its virtue and that the only connection between the Habsburgs and Charlemagne was his sword which 
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Within one hundred years the Habsburgs under Charles would also acquire the Spanish 
crown, and the Portuguese, American and African colonies which came with it. “By 1519 this 
empire stretching from the Danube Basin across Western Europe and then over the Atlantic 
Ocean […] was truly an empire on which the sun never set”. This merger lasted until 1555 when 
Charles abdicated his Austrian crown to his brother Ferdinand I, keeping the Spanish half to 
himself. Ferdinand quickly increased his half by claiming the Crowns of Bohemia and Hungary 
for himself after their king was killed by the Turks, although the hegemony over these lands was 
consolidated only in 1699 after the Turks were officially booted out of Hungary11. As Kennedy 
contends, “For about a century and a half after 1500, a continent-wide combination of kingdoms, 
duchies, and provinces ruled by […] the members of the Hapsburg family threatened to become 
the predominant political and religious influence in Europe”, although he concedes that, “Given 
the rivalries endemic to the European states system, therefore, it was hardly likely that the 
Habsburgs would remain unchallenged” 12. Austrian success early on during the Thirty Years 
War supported the earlier premise, but as the length of the war and the terms of the Peace of 
Westphalia13 demonstrated, Austria lacked the resolve to rule all of Europe.  
                                                                                                                                                             
was ceremoniously passed on, Crankshaw, p.60. Aeneas Sylvias (later Pope Pius II) agreed: “‘Although you 
acknowledge the Emperor for your king and master, he possesses but a precarious sovereignty; he has no power; you 
obey him only when you choose; and you are seldom inclined to obey. You are all desirous to be free; neither the 
princes nor the states render him what is due; he has no revenues, no treasure. Hence you are involved in endless 
contests and wars; hence also rapine, murder, conflagrations, and a thousand evils which arise from divided 
authority”’, Crankshaw, p.78.  Nevertheless Crankshaw does concede that some of the German electors still viewed 
the Emperor as a temporal head, Crankshaw, p. 69; he also compares this Empire to the failed League of Nations, 
Crankshaw, p. 78.      
11 Brook-Shepherd, pp. 11-13; the quote is on p. 12.  
12 Kennedy, pp. 31-33. The first quote is on p. 31, the second on p. 33.  
13 It was this treaty which lit the fuse which would slowly mark the doom of Austria. First, by allowing the various 
German Princes the ability to chose Protestantism over Catholicism, Austria allowed these Princes the ability to 
decide their allegiance to the Vatican, and hence the Holy Roman Empire. If Catholicism lost its prestige, then the 
Empire and Emperor, whose prestige was legitimized by this Crown, lost the ability to demand allegiance based on 
Divine Right. The door was open for demanding sovereignty from the crown. Second, another stipulation gave 
Brandenburg Farther Pomerania. This territorial union would in 1701 become the kingdom of Prussia, the same state 
which would later lead the whole of Germany to demand sovereignty from Austria. “Far from gaining the 
domination over Europe which they had hoped for and expected, the Habsburgs had to sign a document which 
brought into being an entirely new and rival power which was to dispute their supremacy and, finally, soon after 
 5
Nevertheless in 1699 by expelling the Turks, Austria legitimized her prestige as hegemon 
of central Europe. She defended Christianity from the threat of Islam not only in her own 
backyard of Marchfeld, but in the distant lands of Eastern Europe as well. Without her, England, 
France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and all of Christian civilization could potentially fall victim to the 
Muslim menace. Keeping with her original mission, she was the last Mark of Christian 
Civilization and the first line of defense in case the dam ever broke. She was necessary, a 
Christian hero, and on paper on behalf of the Roman Empire, administered its remains in Italy, 
Germany, and Eastern Europe. Not only had she already dominated the political climate of 
Europe for a couple of centuries, as well as most of the continent and its overseas colonies while 
under Charles, but even after her bid for European hegemony failed, she remained the strongest 
power on the continent as well hegemon in central Europe. For a time she even unofficially ruled 
France, for Queen Marie Antoinette was a Habsburg.  
Oddly enough the decapitation of this Queen would lead to the eventual death of Austria 
as a hegemonic state. Slowly the Napoleonic Wars, the Wars of Italian and German unification, 
and World War I bled Austria out of existence. Following the footsteps of her predecessors, 
Athens, Macedon and Rome, she disappeared from world politics, losing all her hegemony on 
the way. Austria had everything and lost everything. She went from imperial riches to the rags of 
the Third Reich; from the most dominant European nation to the least. The loss of prestige was 
ultimate. What began in 1792 with the rise of the French Republic, culminated in 1938 when she 
ceased to exist. How did this hegemon, like all inevitably will, cope with the loss of its prestige? 
II. The Realist Prediction  
The Realist Premise  
                                                                                                                                                             
wresting it from them, drown in a vortex of its own creation, dragging down the Habsburgs with it: the 
Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg”, Crankshaw, p. 128.       
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“It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to 
understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at 
some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing 
designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last forever”14.  
The above justification by Thucydides for writing his account of the Peloponnesian War 
farsightedly rings true to the modern realist. It touches on two key elements of this dominant 
theory of international relations: first, the words “human nature being what it is” implies that 
human nature does not change, realists agree; the second statement, “repeated in the future” 
implies that war is inevitable. This follows logically, considering the foundation of realist theory. 
The primary motivation of any individual is to survive to live another day. A proper 
government affords the necessary protection to meet this primary motivation. Yet the 
international system lacks a higher authority and for this very reason is in a constant state of 
anarchy. As a result, although states guarantee individuals’ survival, there is nothing to guarantee 
their own. States must live in constant fear that they will be eliminated. The only way to 
guarantee survival is to ensure that one has the capability to protect oneself from others, or in 
other words a relative advantage. Accordingly states are not primarily concerned with absolute 
gains15, but with relative gains16. This implies that all relative change must be resisted with all 
means possible, including war. Prestige is no exception.  
 Prestige defines who has pull in international politics. It “is the every day currency of 
international relations.” How a state acquires it has changed over the centuries. In ancient times, 
ideology conferred prestige; Athens and Sparta received their prestigious statuses as the leaders 
of democratic opposition against Persian authoritarianism. Throughout the Renaissance prestige 
                                                 
14 Thucydides, p.48 
15 Those gains which leave either A, and/or B better off  
16 Those gains which compare A’s advantage vis-à-vis B’s.  
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depended on dynastic glory. After the rise of the secular state following the Peace of Westphalia, 
prestige became closely associated with the capabilities of a state in the international system. The 
Concert of Europe implied that prestige no longer depended as much on actual state capability as 
it did on membership in this exclusive club. Following the First World War until the end of the 
Cold War, ideology once again played a role; this time it was the leaders of capitalism against 
those of communism. In modern days it is bestowed by military and economic abilities very 
much in a similar fashion as the pre-Concert days. What the following implies for this 
investigation is that whatever bestowed it, prestige has always and continues to define a state’s 
role in the international system17. Those who have it, dominate. Those who do not must follow.  
This of course implies that prestige is relative; some must have influence, and others must be 
influenced.  
 The danger with relative calculations is that change is inevitable. Gilpin has developed a 
rather comprehensive cycle of war and change in international politics. Considering the cyclical 
nature of the system there is no clear starting point, but for the purposes of argument, equilibrium 
shall serve as one. At equilibrium the status quo is stable. It is clear who the dominant and 
subordinate actors of the system are. As time passes that which gave the dominant state power, 
such as military and economic innovations, slowly diffuses throughout the system while at the 
same time the dominant power begins to stagnate. Consequently as the subordinate powers 
increase in strength and make the status quo harder to manage, the dominant state’s stagnation 
makes it harder to adjust to the new demands; “the preservation of the status quo becomes even 
more difficult, and the international system enters a state of disequilibrium”18. What is key to this 
                                                 
17 Schweller, pp.27-33; the quote is on p. 27   
18 Gilpin, pp.156-187; the quote is on p. 157 
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disequilibrium is that once a ‘critical point’ of no return has been crossed, it can only be fixed by 
a new status quo; there is no going back to the ‘good old days’19.  
As subordinate powers rise to the rank of greatness, the international system must make 
room. The only way to do so is at the cost of the status quo powers. The international system is 
slow to adjust causing a gap between the relative status of a power and its relative capabilities20. 
The result is a growing gap that must be crossed sooner or later, and a status quo power will 
prefer the second of the two choices. Rather than make the adjustments necessary to reestablish 
equilibrium by readjusting its self perception, the declining power usually makes matters worse 
because it refuses any change, and typically does everything in its power to oppose it21, even if it 
means preventive war.   
 The inevitability of such a war is the consequence of the very nature of decline; if B is 
relatively increasing its ability vis-à-vis A, the longer A waits, the harder the battle will be. This 
is only expounded because states feel losses much more so than gains; a temporary gain 
somewhere will typically do little to quell the pain of loss. Also playing a huge role is reputation; 
no one wants to lose a game of chicken. Consequently the closer the actor gets to the possibility 
of crashing, the more irrational his decision making becomes22. Fed by the implications of 
domino theory states will often do all they can to keep that first domino from falling23, fearing 
the new status quo they will be forced to accept if they do nothing24. Preventive war is just one 
more chance for the declining power to reassert itself and preserve the status quo25. Yet 
preventive war is typically frowned upon, and hurts the aggressor’s diplomatic relations, often 
                                                 
19 Doran, p.392 
20 This suggests that a states self-perception must adjust to the changing status quo. The primary goal of this paper is 
to explore how Austria met this challenge.  
21 Doran, pp. 377-392; Snyder(1993), pp. 2-25 
22 Levy, pp. 87-101 
23 Snyder(1993), p.4; Snyder (2003), p32 
24 Fearon, pp.385-407 
25 Walzer, pp.76-82 
 9
resulting in complete isolation26. Even more dangerous is the fact that it can quickly get out of 
hand, and grow from a war which shocks the system, to one which can destroy it27.  
 Massive war occurs when a critical point has been crossed. Usually the aggressive 
government has unsuccessfully struggled to oppose a profound negative change in the system 
and decides to risk it all, while the other states of the system fail to guide it towards a peaceful 
transition28. Such wars will occur when there is an extreme contradiction between the status quo 
and the actual distribution of power29. Three particular conditions arise as the tide approaches. 
First, states begin to feel that time and opportunity are closing in and as a result international 
relations become a zero-sum game. Second, the conflict at hand takes on psychological values 
causing states to give the war more significance than it necessarily deserves, inadvertently 
making the situation seem even more irreversible. Finally, the primary actors loose control of the 
very cataclysm they started30. When the war ends, the cycle starts again. A new hierarchy of 
prestige is established in relation to the present distribution of power. When a new gap forms and 
the hierarchy looses its credibility the cycle of change will begin again; “it has always been thus 
and always will be, until men either destroy themselves or learn to develop an effective 
mechanism of peaceful change”31.   
The Realist Model 
 The above suggests that Austria should have coped in the following way as her self-
perception adjusted to fit the new status quo. At first, she should have failed to recognize that 
any change had occurred. Second, once it was obvious that a transformation was underway, 
                                                 
26 Snyder, pp.32-40 
27 Gilpin, p.191 
28 Doran, pp. 373-393 
29 Schweller, pp.44-45 
30 Gilpin, pp.198-202 
31 Gilpin, p.210.  
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Austria should have taken steps to oppose this transformation. Third, after her initial efforts at 
resisting a change in prestige failed, she should have resorted either to preventive war or 
expansion. Fourth, after all the following methods failed, Austria either should have relinquished 
her fate to the new status quo, or as Gilpin suggests more likely, destabilized the system to such a 
degree that a massive hegemonic war was the only way to restore equilibrium. Fifth, once 
equilibrium had been restored, it is expected that Austria should have accepted her new role as a 
peripheral power.  
The following case study supports all the above postulates. Austria’s actions during and 
after the Napoleonic Wars support the first. Her role in forming the Concert of Europe and 
actions during the Revolutions of the 1840s and the Crimean and Prussian Wars support the 
second. Her war against Italy and expansion in the Balkans respectively support the two methods 
of the third proposition. All events leading up to and including World War I support the fourth. 
Her adjustments after the Prussian War and behavior after both World Wars supports the fifth, 
although her lack in coming to grips after defeat to Prussia and the actions of her royal family 
suggest there is some lag during which the declined hegemon must come to terms with its new 
position.  
III. Failure to Recognize   
The Napoleonic Wars  
On October 6, 1790 Leopold II was crowned (at this point a Habsburg tradition) Holy 
Roman Emperor. This was done as an act of defiance to the Constituent Assembly in Paris which 
had two months previously abolished all feudal rights, including those of the German 
principalities of Alsace and Lorraine32. What followed were the Napoleonic Wars, and two peace 
                                                 
32 Since the Principalities of Alsace and Lorraine were at that time Habsburg possessions, France had no right to 
direct their policy; hence this was an act of war against Austria.  
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treaty signings by Austria; the first one after Prussia’s defeat, and the second one after Austria 
declared war once again as part of the Second Coalition33. Both were humiliations for Austria. In 
the first treaty she agreed to cede her provinces in the southern Netherlands to France and to 
recognize the Cisalpine Republic of Lombardy34. In the second at Lunéville, she was forced to 
recognize the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, as France’s boundaries, as well as all the puppet 
republics Napoleon left in his wake.  
On May 1804 Pope Pius VII crowned Napoleon as Emperor of France. Since, “Europe 
had room for only one latter-day Charlemagne”35, and since on May 1804 Napoleon technically 
became that, on August 10, 1804 Francis decided that the best way to defend his possessions 
against Napoleon was to consolidate his Empire into the Austrian Empire, although he continued 
to sign his documents ‘Roman Emperor Elect’ next to ‘Hereditary Emperor of Austria’. This way 
Napoleon could not claim rule over Germany. This of course resulted in retaliation at Austerlitz, 
the eventual Peace of Pressburg, and the concession of Austrian prestige in Western Europe to 
the Confederation of the Rhine36.   
The loss of the Holy Roman Empire was a devastating blow to Austria’s prestige, yet 
Francis coped with this loss via denial, suggesting to all the German principalities that the 
‘Hereditary Empire of Austria’ would take care of them, and retaining for this new creation the 
traditional Holy Roman symbol of the double-headed eagle, and traditional colors of black and 
gold37. With much of the old Empire under the Confederation of the Rhine, Austria believed in a 
                                                 
33 Kennedy, pp. 121-125 
34 Brook-Shepherd, pp. 34-35 
35 Brook-Shepherd, p. 35 
36 Austria had to cede what she still held of the Venetian Republic to France, Tyrol and Vorarlberg to Bavaria, and 
the rest of her German lands to Band and Württemberg. A procession of sixteen German states on July 17, 1806 led 
by Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden assembled in Paris to repudiate all the laws of the Holy Roman Empire, and 
created the Confederation of the Rhine, with Napoleon receiving the title of ‘Protector’, Brook-Shepherd, p. 35-36.   
37 Brook-Shepherd, p. 37 
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status quo which no longer existed38. The erroneous declaration of war in 1809 resulted in defeat 
once again. Not only had France managed to crush Austria on the field of battle again, but 
Napoleon slept in Schönbrunn Palace while her true inhabitant was a refugee in Hungary. The 
Peace of Schönbrunn was another devastating blow39. Nevertheless three years later Austria was 
back at war with Napoleon along with the other powers of Eurasia. After coalition victory, the 
return of Napoleon, and his mistake in going to Russia, the French scourge was finally done in, 
and with the Second Treaty of Paris, Austria regained most of the possessions she had lost during 
the wars, and the prestige they took with them40.   
The Napoleonic Wars dealt a huge blow to Austrian prestige. Nevertheless by keeping 
the flag and colors of her past, she pretended that nothing had changed. She continued to believe 
in her superiority over France, and consequently signed a handful of peace settlements which 
followed losses. Nonetheless in 1815 her stubbornness during the Napoleonic Wars to accept that 
French dominance over German lands and the change in the status quo paid off as she emerged 
with her lost territories regained and prestige restored. She could not have done so on her own, 
and one can only wonder what would have happened had Napoleon stayed out of Russia. It was 
now clear that Austria could no longer administer Europe by herself, and France now posed an 
ever pressing challenge in the west, but for the time being this challenge was kept in check by a 
defensive alliance signed between Austria, Prussia, Russia and Britain. Her hegemonic prestige 
over Germany and parts of Italy was restored, and for the time being she was the first line of 
                                                 
38 Kennedy, p.127 
39 This time Austria ceded her share of Poland; parts of Carinthia, Carniola, and Croatia; the rest of her Adriatic 
possessions; and her German territories along the Bavarian border. “The Emperor, at one blow, lost some 3.25 
million subjects” Brook-Shepherd, p.37  
40 Kennedy, pp. 136-138. With the signing of the treaty the following territories were entrenched in the Austrian 
Empire: Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia, Silesia, Slovakia, Transylvania, Bukovina, Croatia-Slavonia, 
Carniola, Gorizia, Istria, Dalmatia, Lombardy and Venetia, Kiste, p.9. Austria was also handed the title of President 
of the German Confederation. “Austria was astride the Mediterranean as well as the Danube, and president to boot 
of the re-established Germanic Confederation. The Emperor had more prestige than ever, as well as more than four 
million new subjects”, Brook-Shepherd, p. 42.    
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defense against the return of French aggression41. “To all but an extremely radical minority, the 
idea of Europe without an Austrian empire, the reincarnation of the time-honored Holy Roman 
empire, to preserve the balance of power, was unthinkable”42.  Her hegemonic prestige in central 
Europe was a key element of the status quo43, and for the time being none of the powers of 
Europe would dare challenge that. Of course the war had eliminated the pre-Napoleonic status 
quo, and although certain aspects of this status quo reappeared in 1815, other key ones did not, 
and Austrian failure to acknowledge them would lead to her destruction.  
IV. Opposition to Change  
The Concert of Europe: Metternich’s Vision  
 The goal of the Concert of Europe’s key engineer Prince Clemens Metternich was to 
establish a global peace so as to freeze the status quo after the Napoleonic Wars forever. Rather 
than seeking a global order in which Austria could dominate, he simply wanted global peace. His 
model consisted of three fundamentals: 1) domestic sovereignty of all nations; 2) enforcement 
and preservation of treaties; 3) agreement by all parties to resolve disputes through diplomacy. 
This was based on his belief that there were only two ways for a state to guarantee its survival, 
by entering a treaty based federation of states or via alliance with other great powers. He 
believed Austria could only survive by following the former of these two paths44, since the later 
and the coalitions it produced resulted in two bloody centuries of warfare. This reinforces what 
Schweller proposed in his paper. The peace of Westphalia had changed what conveyed prestige. 
                                                 
41 Brook-Shepherd, pp. 41-42 
42 Kiste, p.10  
43 “The Habsburg Empire, sprawled across Europe form the northern-Italian plain to Galicia, would act as the central 
fulcrum to the balance, checking French ambitions in western Europe, and in Italy, preserving the status quo in 
Germany against both the “Great German” nationalists and the Prussian expansionists, and posing a barrier to 
Russian penetration of the Balkans. It was true that each of these tasks was supported by one or more the other Great 
Powers, depending upon the context; but the Habsburg Empire was vital to the functioning of this complex five-
sided checkmate, if only because it seemed to have the greatest interest of all in freezing the 1815 settlement,” 
Kennedy, pp. 162-163.  
44 Sofka, pp. 115-133.  
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Austria thought herself to be great for her dynastic abilities in an era when state capability 
conveyed prestige. Metternich fought to return to the earlier with success; during the Concert Era 
prestige was conveyed via membership of an elite club and not state capability. He established an 
order in which Austria could play the role of equal despite her actual capabilities. It was an 
international society of states which had to cooperate externally but could do whatever they 
chose internally.  
The Revolutions of the 1840s 
 The Napoleonic Wars brought more to Europe than bloodshed, they brought liberalism. 
Where this new ideology reared its head in the Austrian Empire, just as the government refused 
to allow any decline of international prestige, any threat to its domestic prestige was eliminated. 
This led to a very bloody end to the 1840s for Austria internally, although externally she was at 
peace. Any questions of self-determination in Italy, Hungary, or Austria herself were met with 
military force. The consequence of this violent resistance to liberalism was the alienation of her 
liberal neighbors on whom she depended to maintain her position in Europe, France and 
Britain45. Nevertheless her neighbor to the east, Russia, too shared an interest in Austria 
remaining an absolute monarchy like her, and in 1849 came to her assistance and helped crush 
the last of the internal revolutions. Oddly enough Austria failed to repay the favor during the 
Crimean War, one of her many mistakes in coping with the loss of prestige which began after the 
Napoleonic Wars.   
Italy 
                                                 
45 Kennedy, pp. 159-160 
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The Austrian populace and the state which governed it never expected troubles with 
Italy46. The way they treated their subjects suggested nothing less. One example were the nobles 
of Milan who although recognized as so by fellow Italians, had their titles officially banned in 
1818 by Imperial heraldic commissions. Milan was not alone. In general all Italian titles of rank 
were lowered once they entered Vienna, and most Italian nobles were barred from Austrian 
courts47. After a while Austrian policy took the following form: “The people love us; the nobles 
hate us; we must, therefore, annihilate them”. This backfired since the heavy taxation which 
followed led to a serious depression in Northern Italy, and caused the peasants to side with the 
Carbonari and Nobles48. The Emperor responded with Order 32449, but this did not quell 
discontent, and what started as Carbonari movements in the 1820s, by June 1848 had exploded to 
outright war between Austria and King Charles Albert of Piedmont-Sardinia. The Austrian 
commander in Italy proved very effective and by August this insurrection was over50.  
Austria 
In the 1840s a strong economic depression in Vienna led the populace to demand changes 
from the government which for the previous couple of decades, under Metternich, had become 
very oppressive. The end of feudalism was not enough. On March 12, 1848 the Emperor 
                                                 
46 The majority of the population had no political opinions and sects were less active in Austrian Italy than in the rest 
of the peninsula. There was also the belief that inter-city rivalry prevented any Anti-Austrian movement, Sked, p. 33  
47For example Italian dukes in Vienna were known as counts, Sked, p.62 
48 Sked, p.134 
49 “A higher form of Carbonari, called Young Italy. The aim of this society is the overthrow of existing governments 
and of the complete social order; the means which it employs are subversion and outright murder through secret 
agents. It goes without saying therefore that anyone who knows of these aims but whom, none the less, joins Young 
Italy is guilty of high treason. He is also guilty even if, given that he knows its aims, he merely fails to prevent its 
progress or to point out its members and, as guilty, is liable to punishment under Article 5 of the Articles of War. 
Likewise form the date of publication of this order, no one will be able to excuse himself by saying that he was a 
member of Young Italy and yet was ignorant of its objectives. On the other hand, anyone who, out of remorse, 
reveals the members of the same, its statues, the aims and undertakings of its leaders, if there are still secrets or if 
their work can still be prevented, is assured complete immunity from punishment and his actions will remain secret”  
Sked, p. 44 
50 Brook-Shepherd, p. 62 
 16
conceded to a demand that Metternich resign51. The next set of demands which included power 
sharing with a representative body, led to the siege of the Hofburg on May 15th, the exile of the 
royal family, and the concession to establish a single-chamber Parliament known as the 
Reichstag52. The Emperor returned on August 12th, but after the lynching of Count Theodor 
Latour on October 6th, the family once again took flight leaving it up to Windisch-Graetz and 
Martial Law. The capital surrendered on October 29th, incurring 2000 casualties along the way. 
The government’s power was then reconsolidated in two ways. First, Emperor Ferdinand, who 
was mentally challenged, stepped down allowing Francis Joseph to accede to the throne on 
December 2nd. Second, a new constitution was established the Monarchy as a constitutional one. 
In reality the Emperor’s ‘special powers’ demonstrated that “Behind this liberal screen, however, 
stood the substance of almost unfettered monarchical power” 53.  
Hungary  
The Hungarians had already revolted in the early 1700s and failed, but in the late 1840s 
the climate seemed right to do so again. The underlying reasons were similar to those in Austria. 
The people wanted civil rights and the end of feudalism. These demands increased to full 
separation after Hungary, via the Reichstag, was reduced to the level of all of Austria’s other 
possessions rather than as her crown jewel; after all the Magyars viewed themselves as equals 
with the imperial nation54. While Austria was brought back to control with relatively little force, 
it proved much harder to do so in the Hungarian half. After Hungary overwhelmingly defended 
                                                 
51 Kiste, p.11 
52 Brook-Shepherd, pp. 60-61 
53 The ability to veto any legislation; ability to appoint and dismiss all ministers and officials; his mandate which 
could dissolve parliament, and a stipulation that in case of an emergency he could rule unhindered, Brook-Shepherd, 
pp. 62-68 
54 The Elective Crown of St. Stephen was handed to the Austrian Emperor after his defeat of the Turkish forces. 
Rather than allowing Austria to engulf Hungary into a province, the Magyars only saw themselves ruled by her as 
long as her Emperor, by their choice, was allowed to wear the crown. When the state demonstrated in 1848 that 
membership in the Empire was no longer elective, the Magyars wanted out, Brook-Shepherd, p. 62-67. 
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her independence, on May 1, 1849 the Emperor was forced to request Russia’s help55. On August 
13th at Világos, the Hungarians surrendered to the Russian commander Paskievicz56.  
“The young Emperor’s reign had started with an absolutist regime draped in liberal 
verbiage being proclaimed from the Austrian half of his realm, and a bloodbath carried out in the 
Hungarian half”57. Italy, Austria, and Hungary reaffirmed that a change in Emperors did not 
change the way the Empire coped with the loss of prestige. When Italy and Hungary asked for 
their sovereignty and vis-à-vis a decrease in Austrian prestige, they paid with blood. When the 
Viennese demanded a role in administering this empire, and hence again threatened Imperial 
prestige within the Empire, again blood was the cost. The Empire resorted to oppression so as to 
quell revolt, believing that if enough force was used, the status quo and Austria’s prestige would 
remain. Oddly enough, the effect was completely different. Asking for help from Russia only 
proved what the world was coming to understand; the once stable Empire State was beginning to 
break apart and could no longer hold herself together without outside help. The new Emperor, 
who took power during these revolutions, was in complete denial58. Kiste contends perhaps he 
had the right to do so59. Nonetheless the close call he had with assassination in 1853 should have 
changed this perspective somewhat60.   
                                                 
55 Tsar Nicholas had assured Francis Joseph from the moment he received his throne that he had an army in Galicia 
ready to march the minute the order was given.  
56 Sked, p. 95 
57  Brook-Shepherd, p. 69  
58 After his accession to the throne Francis Joseph took two lessons from the revolutions. First, his dynasty had 
triumphed over liberalism, and the suppression of this ideology must be one key task of government. Second, the 
army had ended the revolutions; hence this entity must both be the foundation behind his power and the glue which 
keeps his kingdom together, Brook-Shepherd, p. 70. The irony of the situation might only be obvious in retrospect: 
it was an oppressive police state which led to the revolutions in the first place, yet Francis Joseph believed this was 
the exact way to keep things from repeating themselves.  
59 “As the successor of the holy Roman emperors and sovereign of one of the foremost European powers, he was the 
most powerful figure in the continent, if not the world […] only Tsar Nicholas I of Russia could rival him in terms 
of imperial prestige. No other ruler could run him close”, Kiste, p.19  
60 While taking a stroll on February 18, 1853, Francis Joseph stopped to watch a regiment exercise. While his 
surveillance was underway a Hungarian tailor’s apprentice by the name of Johann Libényi lunged at him with a 
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The Crimean War  
During the Crimean War Austria played a balancing act which proved detrimental to its 
future. Rather than siding immediately with Russia, what would seem the wise decision 
considering their internal similarities and her assistance in quelling the Hungarian revolts only 
four years previously, Austria considered joining the liberal side of the battle. The result was 
indecision which ruined her in the eyes of all the powers involved, as well as making Russia who 
had been her sister in battle, a virtual enemy. The story turned outright tragic in March 1855, 
when Czar Nicholas died, with many blaming Austria for his death61. England and France were 
disgruntled because Austria took forever to make up her mind, and in the end did not help the 
war effort, although her ultimatum definitely played a part.  
The implications for Austria were bad. King Frederick William in Prussia felt betrayed 
that his ally broke neutrality without consent, a feeling shared by many in the German 
Federation62. After the war, Turkey, France and England felt no reason to show gratitude to 
Austria; consequently she played no role during the Treaty of Paris negotiations63. Russia had 
been turned into a virtual enemy64. After helping her in 1849 and backing her against Turkey in 
185365 this was a real stab in the back for the Czar. He went as far as to give away the statuette 
of Francis Joseph which he used to treasure, and told the Austrian ambassador that he was the 
most foolish king in history for having backed Austria previously66. The Russian ambassador 
conveyed a similar message in Vienna. “‘I am sorry for the young Emperor, for his bearing has 
                                                                                                                                                             
knife. The Emperor was saved from instant death by a woman’s scream which caused him to turn his head and 
become the victim of a cut on his neck, rather than fatal stab, Kiste, p. 24  
61 Some said that his death was suicide as a result of the shame he felt from being defeated, while his own son Tsar 
Alexander II claimed it was from a broken heart caused by Austrian ingratitude, Kiste, p.27   
62 Kiste, p. 28 
63 The English Foreign secretary summed up European sentiment following the war, “‘The Austrians lacked finesse 
and, it would appear, loyalty,’” Cassels, p.10  
64 Sked, p.174 
65 Austria threatened Turkey with war, if the later invaded Montenegro  
66 Sked, pp. 172-173 
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so offended the Russians that he can be certain of never a quite hour for the rest of his reign’”67.  
After the war, “she had emerged isolated…But then, as the Habsburgs cheerfully admitted, 
gratitude was never among their strongest points”68. Worst of all, this war had destroyed the 
Concert which Austria was so key in engineering forty years prior. What motivated her to turn 
on her ally?  
Her foreign minister Buol told the Emperor that Russia’s occupation of the Balkans 
posed a threat to Austrian and German interests, and an alliance with Britain and France was 
necessary to contain Russia. Further if war did occur, the location of battle, which would be the 
Balkans instead of the Crimea, would be strategically friendly69. He also believed that by 
following this route he could convince the allies to recognize Austria’s territorial boundaries70, 
and allow the contested principalities to enter her protection after the war. On the other hand an 
alliance with Russia would certainly mean a lack of cooperation, as well as an attack by the 
Western Powers from abroad and new revolutions in Hungary and Italy from within; he was 
even concerned that Prussia would push her claim to Germany in the aftermath which followed 
that route. Neutrality was out of the question, because that would deprive him the ability to 
influence the diplomacy which followed71. In contrast General Hess argued that Russia was 
Austria’s ally against revolution, she was not physically prepared to wage war, and if she lost the 
allies would be sure to keep in mind her internal revolutions when redrawing Europe.  
Nevertheless Francis Joseph sided with Britain and England, why?  Sked suggests the 
reason was Francis Joseph himself. He wanted his Empire to be in par with France, Britain and 
                                                 
67 Cassels, p.10  
68 Brook-Shepherd, p. 77 
69 This way Austria could defend herself better against the Russians, as well as play a powerful role in the diplomacy 
which followed. Basically Buol was saying that by joining, Austria would take the lead in the war as well as the 
negotiations which followed, Kiste, p.172 
70 In other words, the Italian states would loose their French support  
71 Sked, pp. 172-174 
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Russia, and his coming to the throne at time of military success filled him with hot air. He also 
saw Russia as a natural enemy as he himself wrote, “‘It is hard to have to stand up to former 
friends, but there is no alternative in politics, and in the East, Russia is always our enemy’”72.  
The Prussian War 
As far as the German world was concerned the Habsburgs never expected to loose their 
Holy Roman Empire. “The Habsburg dynasty possessed an almost mystic and still unchallenged 
prestige in the German world […] Such prestige could wane and damage itself as it did. But the 
monarchy which carried it could never be eclipsed spiritually on the German stage by Prussia or 
any other power […] In the end, it would have to be swept right off that stage by force”73. By the 
second half of the 19th century there were two competing theories for the future of Germany 
floating around the Frankfurt Parliament: the ‘Great German’74 option, and the ‘Small German’75 
counterpart.  
Although originally raised to the ranks of Kingdom by a Leopold I, a Habsburg in 170076, 
Prussia would prove to be a serious thorn for Austria. Following her failed bid during the earlier 
part of the decade, towards the end of the 1850s Prussia once again began demanding her rights 
in Germany, arguing that Austrian concerns for prestige had put Germany at risk. Crown Prince 
Frederick William of Prussia himself wrote in 1859:  
“The Austrians have long been going downhill, but have with a wonderful talent and subtlety succeeded in 
blinding the world at large and particularly the small German states to this fact; in the eyes of the 
governments of the small states, Austria kept its own prestige and has plunged its allies into all its own 
straits” 77. 
                                                 
72 Sked, p. 271 
73 Brook-Shepherd, p.73 
74 Union of all the German States under Austria 
75 Union of all the German States under Prussia, with Austria completely excluded  
76 Brook-Shepherd, p.26 
77 Kiste, p.59 
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Austrian policy was clear. Austria could not sacrifice her prestige in Germany. When meeting 
with the Prince Regent of Prussia in 1860, Francis Joseph was following this advice from his 
Foreign Office, which Prussia could swallow only as long as Bismarck stayed on the sidelines.  
“‘The Prince Regent must understand that the Imperial Court, even with the best will to further the 
influence, the prestige and the very power of Prussia, cannot but feel the most legitimate reluctance at this 
juncture in sacrificing its rights and its position in Germany. Austria has fought honorably against 
Germany’s hereditary enemy, has suffered losses and money, has had to sacrifice a province in Italy, has 
seen the minor branches of the Imperial House being illegally dethroned in the peninsula; and now she is 
expected to retrace her steps in Germany too! The Prince must understand, as a friend of Austria, that he 
cannot ask such a thing, which would have a disastrous effect internally for the Habsburg Monarchy and 
cause it to lose face throughout Europe’”78 
 As late as August 16, 1863 the Emperor still ignored the realities which would come to 
face him. This is when a Congress of German princes assembled in Frankfurt at his request, to 
hear his plan for a new all German Federation with a popular assembly somewhat still under the 
control of Austria. The plan aroused the imagination of many of the princes in attendance, but 
the absence of Prussia as an act of protest, showed that it was not acceptable to all. Bismarck had 
convinced his King that the invitation to attend had come too late, and that this was an insult to 
Prussia and the Hohenzollerns79. Nevertheless the two countries still allied together in 1864 
against Denmark80; the last mutual decision between Austria and Prussia with the earlier still the 
hegemon of Germany.    
                                                 
78 Sked, p.180 
79 Kiste, pp.51-53 
80 On November 15, 1863, King Frederick of Denmark died leaving the succession to his other two provinces, 
Schleswig and Holstein in dispute, Brook-Shepherd, p.83. After a swift Danish defeat at the hands of Austria and 
Prussia, at the convention of Bad Gastein in August 1865, it was decided that while Prussia would administer 
Schleswig, Austria would do so over Holstein.  In the end both were handed off to the Duke of Augustenborg, Kiste, 
pp. 57-58.  
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 The next year Prussia demanded that Francis Joseph surrender Germany to her. Austria 
decided to fight for her claims. Was this decision, obviously also driven by concerns of losing 
even more prestige, that mistaken? The Earl of Clarendon agreed that for Austria, “‘a disastrous 
war is better than a voluntary disgrace’”81. Even in retrospect Cassels contends that for Francis 
Joseph, surrendering the leadership of Germany was “an alternative he could not as head of the 
House of Habsburg entertain”82. An 1866 letter by Francis Joseph suggests the same sentiment; 
“‘One just has to resist as long as possible, do one’s duty to the last, and finally perish with 
honor’”83. To believe anything else would happen was to remain in denial, especially considering 
Prussia’s military revolution in contrast to Austria’s shortcomings84.   
On June 15, 1866 Prussian troops crossed into Hanover, Saxony and Hesse, forcing 
Austria and her German allies to retreat. While the Prussians advanced deep into Bohemia, 
Benedek sent Francis Joseph a letter crying that peace was necessary at any price. Francis Joseph 
was only concerned with prestige; “‘It is impossible to conclude peace. I command that – if it is 
unavoidable – you should retreat in good order”’. Benedek obeyed and on July 2nd reformed his 
army at Königgrätz. The next day at 7:30 am the first shots were fired. By evening a telegram 
arrived from Benedek proclaiming, “‘The disaster to the army which I feared […] has today 
occurred”’85; Austria suffered more than 40,000 casualties. Although at that point Prussia could 
have advanced into Vienna, she decided Germany was enough. In August the two signed the 
                                                 
81 Sked, p.184 
82 Cassels, p.13 
83 Sked, p.234 
84 Prussia’s military revolution was as follows. A new draft system in which all were obliged to three years military 
service in the regular armed forces, followed by a four year tenure in the reserves. The result was that based on 
population, Prussia had the greatest proportion of men serving in the front-line army. Prussia also established a 
permanent military staff, rather than assembling one in times of need. They had superior rifles. Finally, the concept 
of deploying several full armies which could operate independently and come to each other’s assistance if necessary 
sealed the deal. Austria’s army on the other hand was underfinanced, lacked a staff system, and had a poor leader in 
Benedek. “However bravely individual units fought, they were slaughtered in open clashes by far superior Prussian 
rifles”, Kennedy, p.186. Furthermore a quarter of the forces were needed in Italy, who took the Prussian wars as 
another opportunity to add what remained of Habsburg Italy into the Federation, Kennedy, pp.184-186.  
85 Cassels, p.15 
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peace of Prague. Austria was forced to cede all her claims in Germany, Venetia to Italy despite 
victory on that front, and most of Schleswig, Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau and the 
city of Frankfurt were absorbed into Prussia86. The implications of this defeat were equivalent to 
a coup de tat in the German world. “The days of the Habsburgs as German emperors were over 
for good. True, it was only fictional power, the shroud of Charlemagne, which had been 
surrendered; yet the loss smarted, for that fiction had been part of the dynasty’s glory”87.   
At home morale was horrible and people began proclaiming that the dynasty no longer 
served their interest. Abroad, politics were slowly changing for ever. In 1871 after defeating 
France, Prussia would give birth to the German Empire. This new central European empire 
would grow to overshadow its eastern neighbor and acquire it as a satellite. In 1879 they became 
bound by an alliance which would hold throughout World War I88. A later visit by the Emperor 
of Germany in 1888 foreshadowed who would be the senior partner in this alliance. While 
visiting Vienna in 1888 he attacked the Habsburgs for having too sloppy of an army, for being 
too friendly with the Slavs, and too gentle with the press89. This alliance, German arrogance, and 
Austrian acquiescence would come to fruition during World War I, and eventually spell the end 
of the hegemon. In fact it is safe to say that after 1866 Austria can no longer be labeled a 
hegemon. She had been completely kicked out of Italy and Germany, and all that really remained 
of her Empire was her and Hungary, with the later continuously demanding sovereignty from the 
Reichstag. Further, it is a far cry to suggest that she could even contend with any of the other 
great powers besides possibly the soon to be humiliated France.  
                                                 
86 Kiste, pp. 58-59 
87 Brook-Shepherd, p. 86 
88 After the 1878 war between Russia and Turkey over Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vienna and Berlin signed a treaty 
on October 7, 1879. In this treaty each agreed to come to each others aid in case the other was attacked, Brook-
Shepherd, p.105. Although it took a while to achieve absolute alliance; for example at first Austria did not have to 
come to Germany’s aid if it was attacked by France, Sked, pp. 247-248.  
89 Brook-Shepherd, p. 107 
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V. Preventive War and/or Expansion  
The Italian War of Prevention  
Prompted by Sardinian mobilization in March of 1859, Austria threatened war unless 
they demobilized. When Sardinia refused, completely ignoring the ‘patto di Plombières’90 and its 
implications, she struck. While Magenta ended indecisively although the Austrians did retreat, 
Solferino dragged on until news came that the Prussians were on their way to reinforce Austria. 
Fearing the German combination, French and Italian troops fought their hearts out until a 
thunderstorm forced the Austrians to retreat. After 37,000 casualties were counted for both sides, 
Napoleon III and Francis Joseph were shocked at the carnage, and agreed to an armistice which 
was followed by the Peace of Villafranca91.  
The implications for Austria were for the time being only internal. This Italian victory 
added fuel to the Hungarian revolutionary fire, although Austria herself remained rather calm. 
Unlike the Hungarians who supported the Italian cause, the Austrians were too busy hating the 
Italians for their defeat to revolt again. Nevertheless the Emperor issued two important 
democratic documents, the October Diploma92 and the February Patent93. It appears that at least 
internally Francis Joseph somewhat came to terms that he could not recover the authoritative 
prestige he once possessed, although abroad he still believed that one day he would recover Italy. 
He even demanded that despite the obvious, he still retain the right of conferring the Lombard 
Order of Iron Crown. “It was pathetic display of dynastic vanity and totally at odds with the 
                                                 
90 The agreement bound France and Sardinia to combine against Austria. Once victory was achieved Italy would be 
unified into a confederacy, Savoy and Nice would be ceded to France, and King Victor Emmanuel’s daughter would 
be married to Napoleon III’s cousin, Napoleon Jerome,  Kiste, pp.38-39 
91 Austria ceded Lombardy to Piedmont, giving birth to the Italian Federation. As a complement, she was allowed to 
keep Venetia, Sked, p. 41 
92 Proclaimed on October 20, 1860, the Parliament was granted the powers to reject and approve taxation, and to 
cooperate on framing legislation. The Emperor still retained control over the army and foreign policy, Kiste, p.79 
93 Proclaimed in February 1861, it established a two chamber Parliament, which although still saturated with the 
aristocracy, was mainly represented by the middle classes, Brook-Shepherd, p.80  
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sense of humiliation which ran throughout the Empire”94. Surprisingly he did not want to regain 
his lost prestige via the Americas. When Napoleon III offered his brother Ferdinand the Crown 
of Mexico in the fall of 1861, a territory which rivaled the size of his existing empire, Francis 
Joseph strongly spoke against it, and when his brother accepted the offer, made him renounce his 
claims to the Habsburg possessions. On April 10, 1864, A Mexican deputation presented the 
Crown to Maximilian and Carlota. The affair as predicted ended tragically95. It is interesting to 
consider that United States participation in the world war which would end Austria might have 
been less possible if her southern neighbor at the time was an Austrian Commonwealth.  
Expansion via Bosnia Herzegovina   
In the early 1870s plans for Balkan expansion were very much contained because lacking 
any allies Austria could not risk war with Russia96. The Congress in Berlin following the Peace 
of San Stefano provided the perfect opportunity97. All which was left to do was to walk in as a 
liberating army. When the advanced regiments entered the territories at the end of July 1878, 
they did so proclaiming “‘the Sultan has entrusted his friend, the Emperor, with the protection of 
their lands’ and that they came as friends to restore order, peace and prosperity”. By the end of 
October at a cost of 5000 casualties the ‘liberation’ was complete. In a way this fulfilled a 
prophecy which the Crown Prince had devised in an essay at the age of seventeen entitled, “The 
position of Vienna and our future”. The basic argument of this paper was that who ever 
                                                 
94 Brook-Shepherd, p.78 
95 On April 9, 1864 at Miramare, Francis and Maximilian signed the ‘Family Pact’ in which Maximilian 
relinquished all of his inheritance, with the stipulation that if he loses his throne and is forced to return to Austria, 
Francis would see to his safety and if possible reestablishment in the Empire, Kiste, pp.54-57. On June 19, 1867 
Emperor Maximilian was executed by a revolutionary firing squad, Kiste, p.60 
96 Cassels, pp.22-24 
97 The Congress ended with Austria receiving a mandate to occupy and administer Bosnia Herzegovina as well as to 
garrison the Sanjak of Novi Bazar. This greatly overjoyed the Emperor, as reflected in a letter written by the Crown 
Prince who himself saw this as a way to recover some of the past losses. “‘The joining of two provinces to the 
Monarchy has as we all knew it would overjoyed Papa…I believe that in Bosnia Herzegovina he is aiming at 
compensation for Lombardy and Venetia’”, Cassels, p.101 
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controlled the Danube would be a great power, and considering that the river was the artery 
linking the Monarchy to south-eastern Europe, he saw that as Austria’s new mission. Of course 
this mission as he saw it needed to be carried out not with the use of force, but through the 
peaceful means of bringing civilization and culture to the Balkans; “he was envisioning for 
himself the inheritance of a Danubian Empire”98.  
Troubles between the Czechs and Germans, as well as German fears of a Russian and 
French alliance of containment, worked to limit these initial goals. Left alone once again to fight 
any wars he might start, Francis Joseph realigned Bosnia Herzegovina in his plans from a spring 
board into the east to the last touches he planed to make on his Empire, hoping that the present 
alliance with Germany and peace with Russia would be a status quo for years to come. Over the 
next couple of decades the Empire slowly recovered. By the new century it even appeared that 
the Emperor had regained the respect of Germany whether or not his prestige demanded it any 
more. On May 8, 1908 for his sixtieth anniversary as Emperor, all the kings and princes of 
Germany led by Wilhelm II came to the Schönbrunn to pay the emperor the respect he was due. 
“It was as though they were acknowledging that, despite the transfer of economic, political and 
military supremacy from Vienna to Berlin, the German world still had only one real emperor”99.  
Time was ripe for more expansion. On August 15th the Hungarian and Austrian ministers 
decided to officially annex Bosnia and Herzegovina100.  
“The timing gave some credence to the impression that it was intended as a diamond jubilee present for the 
emperor, but that was certainly not the only reason. During his long and hardly glorious reign, the Austrian 
nation had suffered a sever loss of prestige in her expulsion from Italy in the south, and her removal from 
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the German confederation in the north. Only in the south-east could she still dare risk any from of territorial 
expansion.”  
This expansion outraged Europe. The way Austria had acted was simply against the rules of 
diplomacy and “dynastic decency”101. Francis Joseph sent the notifying correspondence only 
days prior to the annexation and through some mess up England received her notification only 
after the fact. It also sent Austria on a fatal collision course with Russia and Serbia. The reason it 
took until 1914 for the collision to occur was that German threats and English diplomacy 
convinced Serbia to discard her plans for an immediate alliance with Russia against Austria102.  
VI. WWI as a Hegemonic War   
The Balkan Wars and the road towards World War I   
 In December 1912 a strange meeting took place between Germany, Austria, Italy, France, 
and Russia. The substance was not strange; the purpose of the meeting was to make peace after 
the First Balkan War. The circumstances were much stranger, for it appeared more of a family 
reunion than a diplomatic conference between five nations which would be at each other’s 
throats two years later. For example, Count Alexander Benckendorff of Russia, Count Albert 
Mensdorff-Pouilly of Austria, and Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky of Germany discovered they 
were all cousins. In reality this “was the last tranquil image to be reflected in an old world mirror 
which was about to be shattered forever”103. The First Balkan War ended with an overwhelming 
triumph for the Balkan League against Turkey. The agreement which came out of this meeting 
on May 30, 1913 cemented this victory. Yet one month later after a dispute over Macedonia, 
Bulgaria attacked Serbia, this time allying the former enemy Turkey with the Balkan League 
minus one member - Bulgaria, and giving rise to the Second Balkan War. This war ended in 
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August, giving birth to a revamped, stronger and larger Serbia104. Bosnia Herzegovina was now 
partially surrounded by Serbia, and Austria-Hungary needed to act to protect these possessions, 
which although recognized as hers by the Serbian government, were never a voluntary gift. The 
assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo105 was the necessary catalyst.   
Francis Ferdinand’s mission in Bosnia was meant to bring the Serbo-Croatians to an 
equal standing in the multi-national Empire. This went completely against the intentions of a 
Serbian underground group known as the Black Hand. The purpose of this group of which 
Francis Ferdinand was well aware, was to unify all Serbians including those in Bosnia 
Herzegovina. Not only did his plans impede this goal, but as the general inspector of the 
Empire’s armed forces and future Emperor he was a high level target106. Knowing all this, rather 
than discourage him from going, Francis Joseph suggested he should take his wife Sophie with 
him as well107.  
In a Nostradamus-type fashion prior to his departure, Francis Ferdinand told his heir 
Archduke Charles where to find his political testament after his death. Even the Serbian Prime 
Minster found out about the assassination attempt, but the message he sent failed to reach its 
destination108. On June 28, 1914 Francis Ferdinand and Sophie joined their motorcade in 
Sarajevo. Ten minutes on the road and one bomb exploded right behind the royal couple 
wrecking the car to their rear. This did not stop the Archduke from continuing on with his plans 
to go to the city hall and listen to the mayor’s speech. For security purposes the route was 
changed and this proved the greatest folly of all. The lead driver was not aware of the changes 
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and while he was turning around after a wrong turn, a disgruntled Gavrilo Princip lamenting the 
earlier failed assassination found himself ten feet from the royal couple109.  
 The assassination provided the Emperor with the excuse he needed to crush and annex 
Serbia.  The pressure to do so was overwhelming. If Vienna failed to act Austria-Hungary “could 
never hold its head up again”. Abroad, especially in Berlin it was seen as a weak and incapable 
power. Domestically, the ethnic rivalries were intensified with fear that the Monarchy was afraid 
to protect its Balkan possessions. During the crisis Francis Joseph himself uttered the words, “‘If 
the Monarchy must die […] then it must at least die with honour’”110. After receiving Germany’s 
support in response to a letter from Francis Joseph to Wilhelm II111, an ultimatum was sent to 
Serbia on July 23112. On the twenty fifth at 5:55pm, the Serbian Prime Minister Nicholas Paśić 
arrived in person with five minutes to spare to give Serbia’s response. She had acquiesced to 
every demand but one, official Austro-Hungarian participation in the investigation of the 
assassination. Having already crossed a critical point, nothing short of complete acquiescence 
could have appeased Austria.   
That same evening the Emperor signed an order for mobilization, urged to do so as soon 
as possible by the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Tisza, who although against the war initially, 
contended that once that demand had been made, it needed to be followed up so that the 
monarchy could retain face. The order took effect as scheduled on the 28th, the same day 
Wilhelm found out about the Serbian reply which he deemed very acceptable. “‘A great moral 
success for Vienna; but with it every reason for war drops away’”. Yet his response to Francis 
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Joseph was heavily watered down and omitted key statements like the one previously quoted. 
Further, having only arrived on the 29th, it was much too late to stop anything113.     
 Austria had knowingly launched a total war; this was not done in self-defense, it was one 
last chance at glory:  
“What made it seem so was the need to maintain prestige, along with the fear that relative military decline 
would close all options in the future. This combination of a need for prestige plus fear of the future meant 
that a basically irrational view of the Monarchy’s interest could prevail. The element which served to 
obscure this irrationality was dynastic honor. An Empire according to contemporary clauses could only 
defend its interests honorably by force of arms; to compromise or give way without a struggle was to invite 
dishonor. War after all was simply the ‘duel of the nations’ and if gentlemen were still expected to preserve 
their honor and that of their class by challenging their opponents, the same held true for sovereign and 
state. To refuse a challenge would be to give up the rank of a great power. Hence Austria’s wars over Italy 
and Germany, and the decision for war over Bosnia”114.   
  Brook-Shepherd extends this idea even further suggesting that not only did prestige play a role, 
but that the monarchy had once again reverted to the denial of the late 1800s and Emperor and 
subjects abound, all believed that victory was very possible:  
 “there were also psychological reasons which went both wider and deeper, to explain the frenzy of the  
Habsburg peoples. War had come as a catharsis for that gloomy preoccupation with decay and decline 
which marked their entry into the twentieth century. They felt, rather like old Francis Joseph, that, if the 
empire were to die, it should at least die decently. There was even, in August 1914, an unfamiliar sensation 
that perhaps the monarchy was not going to die after all, but was instead experiencing a strange rebirth. The 
war brought with it a surge of pride in being a subject of the multi-national empire, and all its nations, as 
well as all classes, professions and creeds initially shared in the feelings”115.    
At the time of making its decision, was Austria-Hungary as mistaken as it seems?   
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Sked suggests yes. First, by attacking Serbia it was almost guaranteed that Russia would 
enter the war as an enemy, and even if victory could be achieved, annexing the Serbians would 
only fuel the nationalist tensions plaguing the fragile Empire. Second, the alliances which had 
formed guaranteed that this would not be a small conflict, and besides Germany, Austria’s allies 
were inadequate. Third, Austria did not posses the finances or military to fight a great power 
war. Fourth, although the assassinations originally gave Austria a moral advantage in the 
conflict, waiting a whole month to declare war took this advantage away. Fifth, it appeared that 
the monarchy did not need this war to remain as a whole, since for the past few years the 
domestic environment had greatly improved. “The decision to provoke one therefore cannot 
really be considered rational”116.  
World War I   
 After the first campaigns of 1914 the Habsburg forces had been reduced by half, and 
“therefore, the army was more or less a militia”117 By 1916, the Brusilov Offensive had almost 
ended this militia altogether, but German reinforcement arrived just in time118. Not long after the 
old Emperor’s death, November 21, 1916, the Monarchy began to disintegrate from within.  
While Hungary took care of her own needs Austria began to starve. By 1917 the famine had 
reached the armed forces. If food shortage was not enough, inflation cemented that even those 
with money could no longer afford to feed themselves. Potential reinforcements were deserting 
to the woods, willing to risk execution rather than fight for an Empire they no longer cared for. 
Although most of the army still fought on through the autumn of 1918, internal revolutions 
secured that Austria-Hungary would loose the war far before the enemy crossed her borders119.  
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What began on June 29, 1918 with an allied recognition of an independent Czech 
Republic, culminated by September 3rd when all three key allies had recognized the self-
determination claims of all the Monarchy’s nationalities120. Emperor Charles needed a quick 
response. On October 18 he published his ‘Peoples Manifesto’121. The National Councils which 
the manifesto sanctioned came about very quickly, but not necessarily to Charles’ advantage. On 
October 28th the Czech council passed a resolution creating an independent Czech state, the 
Croats followed on October 29th. On November 4th, the Emperor formally abdicated122, and 
within three weeks the Empire was dissolved. Oddly enough, the first nation to proclaim its 
independence was the German-Austrian Republic on October 21123. By resorting to war to regain 
prestige, the Habsburgs had lost not only their international prestige, but their domestic prestige 
as well. The irony of this is that externally no other power wanted to see the Empire fall, but the 
strains the war created nurtured a desire for just such a conclusion internally, and after a while 
the Emperor was forced to accept the inevitable.  
For one, when Francis Joseph passed away in 1916, The Times demonstrated uncanny 
sympathy for what at the time, was an enemy ruler: 
‘“The death of the Austrian Emperor removes a figure that seemed to have become a permanent figure of 
the political configuration of Europe. For more than threescore years he had stood erect while others came 
and went…When he is borne to his last resting place in the Capuchin vault, the world will reflect that an 
era which might have been a great era in Habsburg history has closed amid ruin, bankruptcy, blood and 
tears; but in these reflections there will be place for human compassion with the lot of a man who came as a 
stripling to the throne, who saw brother, wife, son and nephew perish by violence, who lost the fairest 
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provinces of his empire, and who must have ended a long and chequered reign with forebodings of disaster 
to his House and his dominions graver than any which even he had known”124.   
Charles was well aware of this sympathy125, and upon his accession to the throne, was prepared 
to put an end to the war. The Entente Powers were only at war with Austria-Hungary as a form 
of necessity. Germany was the true enemy, and all their plans pointed at strengthening Austria in 
order to weaken Germany. In March it appeared that a separate peace would be negotiated, but 
too many demands on behalf of Jan Smuts brought those talks to an end. Then even worse, once 
the Sixtus Affair hit public news in the spring of 1918, on May 12, 1918 to retain the faith of 
Germany, Charles signed an agreement which ended Austria-Hungary as an independent force. 
The parchment signed at Spa bound the two allies into a military union, reaffirmed their political 
alliance, and made plans for a tariff free economic union. Consequently only four months after 
the United States had reaffirmed her desire to support a newly liberalized Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, her Secretary of State, Robert Lansing was forced to write the following memorandum 
to the White House; “‘The Habsburg Monarchy has clearly now become a satellite of Germany. 
It must be blotted out as an empire’”. The president’s response, brief: “I agree”126.   
VII. Coming to Terms with the New Status Quo  
Denial: Failure to Readjust Self-perception  
After 1866  
Despite the obvious need to readjust her self-perception, after her defeat to Prussia, 
Austria continued to demonstrate the blatant arrogance of a dead power believing itself still 
alive. On October 30, 1866, only two months after the Peace of Prague, Francis Joseph was 
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discussing plans with his Foreign Minister127 about building an anti-Prussian front based on the 
remaining South German kingdoms128 and other enemies of Berlin129. While being crowned the 
King of Hungary, Francis Joseph promised not to only preserve but to increase the territory of St. 
Stephen130.  When handed the privilege of holding the world’s next Exhibition of Industry and 
Art which took place in 1867, Austria fervently built hotels, cafés and restaurants to demonstrate 
to all foreigners that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was still a major power of Europe131. 
Ironically it was during this Exhibition that Vienna’s stock market collapsed for the whole world 
to see132. Even the Crown Prince Rudolf was urging that the time was ripe for the Dual-
Monarchy to expand its influence in the Balkans, via trade, the export of culture, and intensive 
diplomacy, despite any opposition Russia might pose. He even went as far as to tell his wife 
Stephanie while in Constantinople, “‘one day you will be Empress here!’”133 
Three years’ compulsory military service was introduced increasing the total size to 
800,000 men. The infantry was equipped with breech-loading rifles, and the artillery was given 
the most modern weapons. Nonetheless the conservative element remained. While achieving 
much progress with his reforms Archduke Albrecht “seemed unable to understand that improved 
conditions of service would do more to raise the morale of officers without private means than 
the smart uniforms and military bands on which he insisted for this purpose, the cost of which 
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they were compelled to meet out of their inadequate pay” 134. Johann Salvator is a great example 
of what happened to the typical officer if he suggested changes for the system.  
 A veteran of Königgrätz, Salvator was well aware of the heroism the Austrians had 
showed135, and believed that with modernized training and equipment, they could defeat any 
army in battle. In 1975 he published his ideas in 148 pages entitled, ‘Reflections on the 
Organization of the Austrian Artillery’. The Emperor did not approve for superfluous reasons; 
“‘In Vienna I found the exalted personages in a great state of agitation. The Emperor, Albrecht 
and Wilhelm gave me a tremendous scolding. The gist of the long dissertation was that though 
my facts were correct, for political and disciplinary reasons I should not have written the 
pamphlet’”. A letter by the Emperor suggested the same concerns for propriety: 
“‘A brochure entitled, ‘Reflections on the Austrian Artillery’ of which Archduke Johann Salvator has 
acknowledged himself to be the author has recently been published. In it he discusses circumstances 
relating to official and personnel matters in that branch of the service to which he belongs, in a manner 
incompatible with and severely damaging to order and discipline, the foundations of the army’[…]Franz 
Joseph. Vienna, 17th February, 1875’”.  
Much of Salvator’s suggested changes were founded in his belief that modern warfare required a 
training which prepared the soldier to fight as an individual rather than as a blind obedient. He 
was a fervent believer in Moltke’s philosophy that ‘Superiority is no longer to be found in the 
weapon but in the hand that carries it’136.   
The Imperial Family after WWI 
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Even after his abdication Charles expected not only to return to power, but to regain most 
of what he had lost. In March of 1919 he sent a letter to King Alfonso of Spain asking him to 
warn the allies that Bolshevism would swallow up the old Empire, and the only way to stop this 
was the delivery of food to end famine, and support for a revived Habsburg Confederation 
covering the old Empire. The allies declined. Eventually he had to choose between renouncing 
all his claims or exile. Charles responded with the ‘Feldkirch Manifesto’, which proclaimed his 
exile a voluntary self-banishment and the new republican government null and void. “It was a 
symbolic if pathetic gesture to maintain the pride of the Habsburgs and not to admit defeat”. On 
October 20, 1921 Charles began an attempted coup in Hungary. Three days later he surrendered. 
At this point the allies feared another Napoleonic escape from exile, and ensured Charles’s 
tenure in Madeira by blocking all private resources. Tragically the exiled Emperor died in April 
of the next year from bronchitis. The Times looked at his fate with a degree of sympathy. “‘A 
pathetic figure disappears from the world […] More sinned against than sinning, the victim of 
circumstances he had not created and was powerless to contend against, he deserved pity rather 
than censure’”137. Fortune improved for his heir in the 1930s during the chancellorship 
dictatorship phase of the First Republic. On January 7, 1937 a meeting between Chancellor 
Schuschnigg and Archduke Otto (who by the way has been termed ‘The Pretender’) finalized 
plans for a restoration138. Nevertheless Hitler was aware of these plans, and the threat he posed 
caused Chancellor Schuschnigg to pull away from what might have been a very destabilizing 
plan.  
After World War II Otto continued the struggle for his rights in Austria. On May 8, 1956 
he was granted Austrian citizenship, although as retribution of February 21, 1958 he renounced 
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his dynastic claims. Nevertheless his goal was to use politics to his advantage. He argued that a 
constitutional monarchy proved a great solution to republics ridden by party struggles and 
special interests. Foolish old customs such as using the Imperial china during official dinners led 
to one final and exhausting demand of him, to renounce his membership in the house of 
Habsburg-Lorraine; he acquiesced on May 31, 1961. Otto coped with his fate in the same 
manner as his father who coped in the same manner as the Empire before them. He refused to 
come to acceptance, and as the current nature of the Second Republic demonstrates, sacrificed 
everything for nothing139.  
Acceptance: Success at Adjusting Self-perception   
The Compromise of 1867  
The internal politics after the defeat to Prussia did suggest that the Emperor was coming 
to acceptance that some adjustments were necessary. One such change was making sure that 
Hungary did not follow Italy’s and Germany’s path. This began with the signing of the 
Ausgleich140 on May 29, 1867. A few weeks later, On June 8th Francis Joseph resigned his claims 
as Emperor of Hungary, to receive in exchange the crown of St. Stephen and the kingship of 
Hungary. A month and a half later the Ausgleich officially entered into force as Law XII141.  
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Considering the Compromise was a novel move for the Emperor, a quick survey is in 
order to see what were the costs and benefits associated with this concession. There were of 
course certain costs. The Czechs, Tyrolese, Poles, Slovenes and Romanians boycotted this 
Magyar favoritism142. The situation was not helped by a set of Hungarian education laws 
between 1897 and 1907 which began with requirements that all teachers must know Magyar and 
teach in it, and went so far as to demand that town names and tomb stones be in Hungarian as 
well. Those who refused were prosecuted and/or jailed. Foreign policy also became dependent 
on Hungarian desires; for example, the Hungarian hatred of the Slavs increased tensions between 
the Empire and Russia. Considering the agreement had to be renewed every ten years, every 
decade afforded Hungary another chance to demand more from Austria, and Sked contends that 
if not for World War I, by 1917 Hungary would have declared independence. The military 
structure led to many clashes between the two, culminating in the years of 1903 – 1906 when 
Hungarian demands for their own artillery resulted in orders to invade and occupy Hungary, 
although a settlement saw to it that they were not carried out. The two separate governments 
limited the flexibility of the Empire which was required during wartime. At times Hungarian 
protectionist practices would even get in the way of benefits of the merger, such as when they 
refused the linking of rails with Turkey and Serbia to protect their tariff policies. The Hungarians 
also blocked all attempts at land reform.  
Yet the Compromise was no Austrian tragedy. By maintaining the army at the Emperor’s 
command, it made Hungary dependent on Austria. Further the Hungarian militia, which was 
known as the Honvedseg, was denied the luxury of artillery, and was led by a commander in 
chief appointed by the Emperor. Both parties profited economically thanks to the development of 
rail, expansion of the banking and credit system, and from regional market integration. The 
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union allowed Austria a peaceful solution to retain the wealth and manpower necessary to play a 
prominent role in European politics143. Also despite the nationalistic tensions which Hungary 
created in her treatment of her various minorities, the Empire still fought rather unified during 
World War I, although after the war, these tensions were most likely the reason Austria emerged 
a fragment of herself. Nonetheless Brook-Shepherd paints a rather grim analogy of what the 
Compromise meant for the declined Hegemon:  
“Even had a magic formula of defederation been produced afterwards, it could never have been launched, 
given that million of Roumanians, Croats, Serbs, Slovaks and Ruthenes were locked by the king-Emperor’s 
oath into the Hungary of St Stephen. In chess, the end does not come when the king is captured, or his 
crown toppled. It comes when he is unable to move to any other square on the board. That was the position 
of Francis Joseph after 1867, and he had checkmated himself”144.  
The People after 1866 
After Königgrätz while the government lamented, the public who was ready to accept the 
monarchy’s actual standing in the world, seemed unconcerned about the loss of prestige. In fact a 
large outdoor summer carnival was planned on the day that the news reached Vienna of the 
defeat at Königgrätz, and the two thousand participants at this carnival “drank and danced away 
in the Prater as though they were celebrating victory”.  Rather than hating the Prussians for what 
they had done, the Austrians seemed to welcome their leadership. In 1868 the ‘Deutscher 
Volksverein’ or “German People’s Union was founded in Vienna, and later that year the ‘Third 
Assembly of German Marksmen’ met at the Prater. The defeat of France and the rise of the 
German Empire led to as much celebration in Austria as it did in Germany, with Austrian 
students shouting pan-German slogans. Occasionally there was some discontent over the loss, 
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but rather than blame Germany, this was solved with the scapegoat of anti-Semitism145. 
Nevertheless not all enjoyed this new inferiority, and many turned to suicide as a form of coping. 
In fact in one of her memoirs, Walburga Ehrengarde Helena Lady Paget, reported that she was 
cautioned to stay clear of the Prater in the early morning to give the patrols chances to remove all 
the corpses from the trees.    
The First Republic  
In order to receive the recognition she needed after World War I, the First Republic was 
forced to make enormous concessions reducing her original 30 million population to a mere 6.5 
million, and her territory from 180,000 square miles to around 50,000. “Vienna had been 
transformed from one of the greatest seats of European power, whose size and make-up matched 
its status as the capital of a multi-national empire, to the over-heavy and badly positioned center 
of a small republic146. If this primary acceptance of prestige loss was dynamic, the reaction to 
Hitler’s invasion some seventeen years later was downright pervasive.  
As Brook-Shepherd concludes, “Austria’s darkest hour was not her finest”. Following 
Schuschnigg’s orders that no German blood shall be spilled, not a single shot was fired, not even 
in protest. The Germans simply marched in at dawn followed by Hitler in the afternoon. Three 
days later Hitler gave his speech proclaiming for Austria a new mission, “‘The oldest eastern 
province of the German nation shall from now on be the youngest bulwark of the German nation 
[…] I can in this hour report before history the fulfillment of the greatest aim of my life – the 
entry of my homeland into the German Reich’” 147. In the election which followed Hitler was 
elected Chancellor by 99.73%. Only 17,000 votes were against him; 11,929 said ‘No’, the other 
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5776 were spoiled. Within one year Austria would disappear from existence with her legal title 
replaced to ‘The Reichsgaue of the Ostmark’; her chancellor reduced to the rank of ‘Governor of 
the Austrian Provincial Government’, her crown jewels taken from the Hofburg to Nurember, 
and with Hitler renaming her streets148.   
The Second Republic  
  During WWII Austria was not a part of the Allies’ post war plans. The United States 
and Britain had plans to merge her with Germany; it was in fact the Soviet Union who could 
much easily annex a smaller Austria, which suggested restoring her independence after the 
war149. The later plan was adhered to, but Austria had to wait until 1955 for the last occupying 
soldier to leave. The price for her freedom was the declaration of neutrality, a status she would 
adhere to throughout the Cold War, and which would facilitate her with the ability to enact some 
political leverage as a key negotiator between the United States and the Soviet Union150. The fall 
of the later sent Austria on a new path which she is yet to complete.  
When the Iron Curtain fell Austria’s old subjects became free to interact with their former 
keeper. Brook-Shepherd believes that in no way did Austria posses intentions to rebuild her 
empire; “By now, that concept lay beyond the psychological as well as the physical bounds of 
the republic’s strength”. Instead the Empire’s old infrastructure which still connected the Danube 
Basin could now allow Austria to function as a hub between east and west European trade. In 
1991 during the Gulf War, as a member of the Security Council, Austria was forced to contribute 
to the war effort, posing in essence a challenge to her previous neutrality. This was a juncture she 
would cross again in 1994 when a referendum was taken whether she should join the EU; 66.4% 
were for it. There were two clear benefits in joining. First, although she could not lead this multi-
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national community as she once had her own, she could advise the EU on how to make itself 
work. Second, it posed a tempting way to counterbalance the threat of a reunified Germany. As 
articulated by her Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schuessel, ‘“Austria must stop being a passive 
spectator hiding behind neutrality imposed after the Second World War’” ; “If we want our say 
in the international community in the questions that affect us, such as the environment, we must 
be prepared to take responsibility for our part in security policy”151.  
VIII. Society as a Mirror  
Gilpin also found in his study that decadence accompanies the hegemonic cycle. Athens, 
Alexandria and Rome were all cultural centers during their hegemony which fell into decadence 
as they declined. It should not come as a surprise that the same is true for Austria. As a society 
grows more affluent it becomes corrupted and its moral values decline. Once the state’s prestige 
begins to decline, the pessimism which follows causes this still somewhat suppressed decadence 
to take over society. Consequently, this decadence hinders most attempts for rejuvenation, and 
only accelerates the change under way152.   
That Austrians did not seek rejuvenation should not come as too much of a surprise 
considering that most believed living was a prerequisite servitude necessary to achieve the 
blessing of death; hence pending decline went hand in hand with this notion. Life was reserved 
for serving god and his appointee on earth, the Emperor. Under Metternich’s police state the 
culture of Biedermeier153 developed in Austria. The nobility had long escaped politics via the 
arts, and the reactionary bureaucracy forced most of the growing middle class to do the same. 
Yet it would be a gross overstatement to say that no intellectuals flourished in Austria during her 
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decline. In fact it is more appropriate to say that most intellectuals flourished in Austria. The 
likes of Karl Lueger, Carl & Anton Menger, Hans Gross, Hans Kelsen, Viktor Adler, Karl 
Renner, Otto Wagner, Rosa Mayreder, Ernst Mach, and Sigismund Freud often frequented her 
streets, and these were the parents of science, psychology, medicine, architecture, arts, aviation, 
feminism and …154.   
Sadly the country within which they resided used bureaucratic red tape to oppose any 
change. Consequently many of these elites saw their revelations come to fruition in more 
progressive states such as the United States than in their own home town, and many other great 
potential intellectuals fell victim to therapeutic nihilism. One stark example is how in 1911, 
Gunther Burstyn’s revolutionary invention (the tank) was rejected by the military as unworkable. 
This bureaucratic inertia was reinforced by the nobility and lower classes which hated the 
industrial revolution, the changes it brought, and its greatest supporters the bourgeoisie. The 
Holocaust several decades saw this anger come to fruition in a mass slaughter of Austrian 
intellectuals, most of whom were Jewish155.   
Nevertheless despite a huge division between the conservative agricultural upper & lower 
classes and the liberal industrial bourgeoisie, the country was united in its belief that the Empire 
would always exist. Max Graf summarized the pathos which filled Austria prior to 1914. “We 
who were born in Vienna, and grew up there, had no idea, during the city’s brilliant period 
before the first world war that this epoch was to be the end […] We enjoyed the splendid city 
which was so elegantly beautiful, and never thought that the light which shone over it could ever 
be that of a colorful sunset”156. After all it was only in 1857 that Francis Joseph ordered the 
medieval walls protecting and separating the inner city from the suburbs torn down, engaging the 
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city of Vienna on a fervent rebuilding agenda screaming a reverence for the past and a belief in a 
stable future157. Ironically the War Office was only completed in 1913. For this reason in 1914, 
peasant, intellectual, and noble alike joined the army blind to the future which was to befall their 
beloved country.   
“So, what was the real temper of Vienna as this ‘City of Lights’ entered on its last years 
as an imperial capital? The answer – as so often in its past – seems to have been a mood of 
foreboding held at arm’s length by frivolity, of self-doubt deadened by self-indulgence”158. 
Cassels entitles this attitude of the Austrians during these years of decline as gemütlich159. Most 
of the citizens did not care for politics for they could play no role; after all the oppression in the 
late 1840s had made this very clear. Nevertheless life anywhere else was unthinkable, however 
fragile and uncertain Austria’s future.  
“To hold things lightly, to enjoy them while one had them but not to try to cling to them, to consider that it 
did not matter if one had nothing to eat on Monday provided one had a good time on Sunday, such was the 
temperament of the Viennese. It was this attitude to life which made the city what one gay young foreign 
Prince described as ‘heavenly’, and of which another delighted visitor wrote ‘I doubt that one could amuse 
oneself more in Paradise’”160. 
An account of Vienna written in 1938 by an English man walking her streets161 suggests 
that during the interwar period much of this overconfidence had evaporated while nostalgia for 
the glorious past greatly increased. Playing the role of a tour guide, Crankshaw points at a 
building or a field and acknowledges the nostalgia associated with it. This helps provide much 
                                                 
157 The Opera House was designed in fifteenth-century Italian style; The Parliament was reflected the classical 
Greek Style; the Town Hall followed Belgian Gothic; the University, Burgtheater, and two Court Museums were in 
Renaissance style, Johnston, p. 148.   
158 Brook-Shepherd, pp.132-133 
159 “It is a compound of agreeable, cozy, tolerant, warm hearted, and there is a hit of kindly laughter in it; it conjures 
up pictures of golden autumn days, light shining on a glass of wine, the comforting warmth of a immediate pleasure 
in simple things,” Cassels, p.59  
160 Cassels, p.61 
161 For a much broader evaluation which ties in the architecture and arts of Vienna with her decline, please refer to 
the whole text.   
 45
insight into the mood of Vienna at her darkest hour. There is much in his narrative to reflect the 
greatness of Vienna as he contends at one point that had the Magyars retained their control, Asia 
would have been much closer to the Atlantic than it is today. He reflects on her opportunities for 
greatness, her legacy, and her fundamental role in Europe. For this very reason, the city still 
retains the gaiety of an Imperial Capital. Yet the key word he uses in describing Vienna is as 
decadent. He describes Vienna as not expecting much for her future, having laid herself down to 
die in self pity rather than go out in one final hurrah, while hinting several times at the fact that 
only a cataclysmic event will resolve her current state; “the culture of decadence has been in 
Austria stronger than anywhere else and has persisted longer and more fruitfully. Traces remain 
to this day. Vienna may be doomed, but the Austrian peasant […] is able to keep a civilized way 
of life running like a streak of gold through dark ages”162.  
IX. Conclusion  
 Hegemons rise and fall, that is what they do. Their self-perception lags behind reality. 
Consequently their coping with this harsh reality tends to pattern the realist framework. At first 
they deny that anything has changed. Once reality hits they oppose it. If initial opposition fails 
they will either attempt to expand themselves or launch a war of prevention so as to impede their 
neighbor’s expansion; which ever route they take relative gains will be the driving force. Once 
prevention and/or expansion fails the system is often left very destabilized, and if the members of 
the system especially the hegemon are unable to readjust roles in a peaceful manner, a massive 
war will occur. After stabilization the ex-hegemon will accept its new role, although ghosts of 
the glorious past will often rear their head. This is just how the system works.  
 Austria is no different. Even with Napoleon camping in her capital she refused to 
acknowledge anything had changed. When this no longer proved possible she opposed rather 
                                                 
162 Crankshaw, pp. 5-245.  
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than incorporated a new status quo; hence the violent oppression of the revolutions in the first 
half of the 19th century, her backstabbing during the Crimean, and her war against Prussia. She 
attempted to forestall the inevitable, via prevention against Italy and expansion in the Balkans. 
Austria needed to change her tone. Instead she refused, and WWI was the result. In the 20th 
century she accepted an inferior role, yet made certain to make Vienna the center of World 
attention periodically. 
 Austria was the embodiment of the Old Order just like Rome embodied the ancient era. 
She was the epitome of the combination of dynasty, Catholicism, authoritarianism, and hierarchy 
which characterized Europe after the fall of Rome. For this reason alone her hegemonic status 
beyond the borders she actually occupied can not be denied; while this order existed, her 
monarch was above all others in Europe. After the Enlightenment the system began to change 
but its champion could not. The new system represented the common man, Protestantism, 
democracy and equality. We are living under this system right now, and under the hegemony of 
its champion, the United States. In World War I the two champions inadvertently met head to 
head for the first time, and in a gentleman’s manner completed the transition which was long in 
the making. Austria perceived herself to embody prestige as a glorious dynastic empire, in an era 
when prestige was conveyed by state capability. For this reason rather than considering her 
actual ability to win wars, driven by honor she went down swinging.   
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